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POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS: THE RESURRECTION
OF SACCO-VANZETTI
ELLIOT C. ROTHENBERG*
The 1921 conviction by a Massachusetts court of Nicola Sacco
and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, for murder of two employees of a shoe
factory, and numerous appeals culminating in their executions in
August, 1927, constitute what may be the most famous criminal case
in American legal history. More than half a century after the execu-
tions, critics were still publishing angry volumes condemning the
administration of justice in the Sacco-Vanzetti case.' Perhaps unique
among American court cases, the six volume transcript of all the
Sacco-Vanzetti proceedings has been published and remains readily
available in law and general purpose libraries.
2
The executions have been condemned as a "tragic miscarriage of
justice,"3 and the founder of the American Civil Liberties Union
charged that "these men were being tried for their political opinions
and their activities, and for being foreigners in a hostile community."
4
A work of the New Deal's Federal Writers' Project in the American
Guide Series remarked, "The injection into the trial of political
considerations ... aroused a worldwide storm of denunciation from
pulpit and press."
Particular reproach has been directed against Webster Thayer,
the trial judge in the Sacco-Vanzetti case, for allegedly being openly
prejudiced against the defendants for their politics. For example,
Professor Morgan claimed that Judge Thayer's prejudice "permeated
the proceedings from beginning to end with its vicious influence. The
defendants had a trial according to all the forms of the law, but it was
not a fair trial."6 In November, 1924, after denying five motions for a
new trial, the judge reportedly gloated to a friend, "Did you see what
* Elliot C. Rothenberg is a Minneapolis attorney and is president of the North
Star Legal Foundation, Minneapolis, MN. He received his B.A. from the University of
Minnesota (1961) and his J.D. from Harvard Law School (1964).
1. See, e.g., R. FEUERLICHT, JUSTICE CRUCIFIED (1977) and H. EHRMANN, THE
CASE THAT WILL NOT DIE (1969).
2. THE SACCO-VANZETTI CASE (1928-29).
3. L. JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 157 (1964).
4. Roger Baldwin quoted in R. FEUERLICHT, supra note 1, at 191.
5. FEDERAL WRITERS' PROJECT OF THE WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION FOR
MASSACHUSETTS, MASSACHUSETTS: A GUIDE TO ITS PLACES AND PEOPLE 219 (1937).
6. L. JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, supra note 3, at 157.
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I did with those anarchistic bastards the other day. I guess that will
hold them for a while."7
In an impassioned attack on the justice of the Sacco-Vanzetti
proceedings, Columbia Professor Karl Llewellyn spoke of the require-
ment, "of that law which is an integral part, in letter and in spirit, of
the institutions we hold dear,' 8 that criminal trials determine guilt or
innocence of a specific offense and not be based on "general social
desirability."
Angel or devil, he has a claim to a fair trial, not of his
general social desirability, but of his guilt of the specific
offense charged against him. Such is the letter of our law.
Such also is our law's spirit....
It evidences the vitality of the policy of keeping the jury,
the trier of fact, from being influenced by irrelevant "bad-
ness," irrelevant "undesirability" of the accused, in passing
on his guilt or innocence of a particular offense. Not only
against the prejudices, the policy-views, of the official in
power, but against the prejudices, the policy-views of the
triers of fact does American law, in keeping with the best
spirit of American institutions, set up its barriers -in favor
of any man who is accused.9
To many, Sacco and Vanzetti were convicted of and executed for
murder not because of responsibility for the criminal act but because
of their radical and anarchist politics. If there is a lesson common to
the massive outpouring of censure of the Sacco-Vanzetti case, it is that
political ideology should have no role in the process of determining
guilt or innocence of crimes.
Yet, the wall separating politics from the judicial process has
been breached again in recent cases before federal and state courts in
Minnesota, New York, and Pennsylvania. These decisions, in contrast
to Sacco-Vanzetti, allowed defendants to avoid conviction or punish-
ment. Nevertheless, they raise disturbing questions with respect to
the role in judicial proceedings of political prejudices of judges and
juries. The precedent of allowing political ideology into the judicial
7. Testimony of James P. Richardson before Governor's Advisory Committee,
in 5 THE SACCO-VANZETTI CASE 5065 (1928-29). and Richardson's affidavit before
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Id. at 5418.
8. Llewellyn, The Sacco-Vanzetti Case, in J. MICHAEL & H. WECHSLER, CRIMI-
NAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 1085, 1090 (1940).
9. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 1086, 1091.
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process to exonerate those committing criminal acts can in the future,
as allegedly was the case in Sacco-Vanzetti, be used by prosecutors
and unsympathetic judges and juries to convict those innocent of
wrongdoing.
The Minnesota federal and state court decisions concerned orga-
nized and deliberate acts of trespass and property damage directed
against the state's two largest defense contractors, Honeywell and
Sperry. 0 Since October, 1982, masses of protesters have staged
periodic day-long blockades of Honeywell's Minneapolis headquarters,
preventing employees and visitors from entering or leaving the
building." In August, 1984, two "peace" activists forced their way into
a Sperry Corporation plant in a St. Paul suburb, destroyed a computer
designed under contract with the Defense Department, and poured
blood over the premises.2
The essential facts were not in dispute in these cases. The only
question was the relevance of the given defendants' ideology regard-
ing U.S. defense and foreign policy to the charges of violations of the
criminal law. Even more than the Sacco-Vanzetti proceedings, which
at least observed the formal requirements of a trial in accordance with
the rule of law and kept political prejudices sotto voce, ideology was
central to the Minnesota cases. Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court
and the U.S. District Court for Minnesota not only allowed the
introduction of, but gave paramount status to, the political opinions of
the accused defendants.
At the many Honeywell blockade trials, which began in the
spring of 1983, the arrested protesters have not denied the facts of
their trespass on company property and harassment of the firm's
employees. Rather, they have insisted in court that their political
opposition to U.S. defense and foreign policy provides them with
moral justification for criminal acts against those manufacturing
defense-related products for the United States.
According to jurors interviewed by the media, juries in June,
1983, acquitted 36 of the first Honeywell protesters tried solely
10. In 1982, Honeywell's and Sperry's Minnesota operations were awarded
defense contracts of $635 million and $263 million respectively. Connery, Gums and
Butter, 14 CORPORATE REPORT MINNESOTA 51, 52 (Sept. 1983).
11. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Oct. 25, 1983, at 1A, col. 1; Rothenberg,
Heat's on Honeywell, and the Public Gets Burned, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 13, 1983,
at 30, col. 3.
12. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Aug. 11, 1984, at 1A, col. 5; Katt and
LaForge, A Sense of Duty Behind the Sperry Incident, Minneapolis Star and Tribune,
Sept. 22, 1984, at 15A, col. 3.
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because of sympathy for their expressed political views. 13 In response
to a request by Minneapolis city prosecutors, a special three-judge
panel on October 25, 1983, ordered that testimony regarding political
beliefs be excluded from subsequent trials as irrelevant to whether a
crime had been committed. 14 The panel ruled that constitutional rights
to a fair trial and rules of evidence do not "allow defendants to use the
court as a forum to air their political, religious, or moral beliefs and
appeal to the passions of the jury."' 5
On August 3, 1984, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court in
State v. Brechon 6 reversed the special court's order and gave the
Honeywell defendants the right to testify to juries as to their political
opinions and why these beliefs supposedly provide justification for
defying the criminal law and infringing the rights of those who work
for defense contractors. Although appearing to acknowledge the
irrelevance of the Honeywell protesters' politics to the question of
guilt or innocence of criminal conduct, the court nonetheless declared
that a trial judge could not exclude political testimony but only advise
jurors to "disregard defendants' subjective motives."'17 The decision
failed to address the question of whether the jury would be prejudiced
by political arguments regardless of the cautions of the trial judge.
Since the Brechon decision, juries have acquitted many of the
Honeywell defendants, even though virtually none have denied the
essential facts relevant to the charge of criminal trespass. 8 Some
juries have convicted other protesters despite their political argu-
ments.' 9 In several cases, however, Minneapolis city attorneys
dropped the charges before trial, because, according to one prosecu-
tor, they "did not think it wise to spend that much taxpayers money
to allow defendants to get up and give their spiel about nuclear
war."
20
13. Jury foreman Susan Kela said, "The jurors were unanimous on the moral
issues. Who is not against nuclear war?" Minneapolis Star and Tribune, June 4, 1983, at
1A, col. 1; St. Paul Pioneer Press, June 4, 1983, at 1A, col. 4.
14. State v. Brechon, No. 83094 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin County, Minn. Oct. 25,
1983).
15. Id. at 14.
16. 352 N.W.2d 745 (Minn. 1984).
17. Id at 751.
18. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Oct. 20, 1984, at 1B, col. 2; Id., Nov. 9, 1984,
at 10A, col. 2.
19. Id., Oct. 16, 1984, at 2B, col. 4; Id., Nov. 22, 1984, at 1B, col. 1.
20. William Korn quoted in Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Oct. 23, 1984, at 5D,
col. 5; Id, Dec. 12, 1984, at 31A, col. 1; St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch, Apr. 6, 1985,
at 7A, col. 1.
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Similar organized mass trespass continues not only against Ho-
neywell, but against other Minnesota defense contractors as well.
Applying the Brechon precedent, a Ramsey County (St. Paul) Munici-
pal Judge allowed 31 defendants on trial for trespass against a Sperry
plant to seek to excuse their conduct on the basis of their political
opposition to Sperry's production of missile guidance systems for the
U.S.. Again, the facts were not in dispute. Still, a jury in April, 1985,
acquitted all the defendants. 2'
A few months earlier, in October, 1984, Barb Katt and John
LaForge, arrested in connection with the Sperry computer incident,
were tried in U.S. District Court 22 on a charge of destroying property
being manufactured for the U.S. government.2 3 At their trial, the
accused did not deny that they had destroyed the computer, but
instead, used the same stratagem as the Honeywell protesters. Over
the prosecutor's objections that "appeals to passion and prejudice" do
not belong in a criminal trial, U.S. District Judge Miles Lord allowed
them to argue their political motives. The defendants then proceeded
to contend that what they regarded as international law justified their
destruction of property which would be used for U.S. defense efforts.2 4
The jury, however, did not accept their apologia and convicted them
of the crime charged, for which they could have been sentenced to ten
years in prison and a $10,000 fine. 25
The jury verdict notwithstanding, Judge Lord released the
defendants with a six-month suspended sentence. 26 In a prepared
statement read in the courtroom explaining his decision, the judge
expressed sympathy for the political objectives of the defendants and
attacked the defense industry in general as "warmongers." 27 He
lauded, by contrast, the "more sanctified endeavor" of the convicted
pair "who by their acts attempt to counsel moderation and mediation
as an alternative method of settling international disputes.
2 8
Judge Lord then excoriated Sperry employees for having alleg-
edly "stole[n] $3.6 million worth of property" by embezzlement from
21. Juror Roger Green said the jurors agreed that Sperry's production of
weapons presented an "imminent danger to the world. We felt that superseded the
trespass law." St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch, Apr. 6, 1985, at 1A, col. 1.
22. United States v. LaForge and Katt, No. CR-84-66 (D. Minn. Oct. 11, 1984).
23. 18 U.S.C. S 1361 (1982).
24. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Oct. 11, 1984, at 1B, col. 1.
25. 1&, Oct. 12, 1984, at 1B, col. 2.
26. Id, Nov. 9, 1984, at 1A, col. 2.
27. Record, United States v. LaForge and Katt, No. CR-84-66 at 15 (D. Minn.
Nov. 8, 1984).
28. Id. at 14.
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the U.S. government and for "wrongfully and feloniously juggling the
books."29 No one at Sperry was ever convicted of or even prosecuted
for such an offense. The failure to punish Sperry officials for this
alleged crime, said the judge, gave him a "clear conscience" in freeing
the defendants.3
0
Finally, he condemned the American system of justice for provid-
ing "one type of justice for the rich and a lesser type for the poor.""
With respect to the Honeywell and Sperry decisions, Judge Lord may
have been correct, but not in the way he intended. No evidence was
introduced of the comparative wealth and income levels of the protag-
onists, but the protesters, in contrast to the employees of Honeywell
and Sperry, had the resources to pursue their cause in the courts.
Sperry defendants Katt and LaForge have stated that they were
inspired by the thought and actions of Daniel Berrigan3 2 who, along
with his brother Philip and several others, was convicted of burglary
and other offenses for illegally entering a General Electric plant in
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, damaging hydrogen bomb components
being made for the U.S. government, and pouring blood on the
premises. Like the Honeywell and Sperry defendants, the Berrigan
group did not dispute the facts relative to the criminal charges
against them but sought to justify their violation of the law on the
grounds of their disagreement with U.S. defense policies. The trial
judge allowed them to testify as to their political views. Defendants
claimed on appeal, however, that they should have been permitted as
well to present the testimony of purported experts on the conse-
quences of nuclear war. In February, 1984, Commonwealth v.
Berrigan33 accepted their argument and ordered a new trial.
The Minnesota and Pennsylvania cases involved crimes against
property. There is nothing in the reasoning of these decisions, how-
ever, which would limit the types of crimes for which defendants could
seek exoneration on the basis of their expressed political motivation.
If, for example, defendants have what is deemed by judges or juries
acceptable political aims for trespass or property damage against
private businesses, would not the principle established permit these
same lawbreakers or others to commit violent crimes against the
persons of the beleaguered firms' employees and executives? At least
one court appears to have answered affirmatively.
29. Id. at 16-17.
30. Id. at 21.
31. Id. at 19.
32. Northern Sun News, Nov. 1984, at 3, col. 1.
33. 325 Pa. Super. 242, 472 A.2d 1099 (1984).
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A month after Judge Lord's decision in LaForge, New York U.S.
District Judge John E. Sprizzo extended the applicability of the cases
discussed above beyond property offenses. Matter of Doherty by Gov.
of United Kingdom"W refused to extradite a Provisional Irish Republi-
can Army (PIRA) member who was convicted by a British court of
murdering a British army captain in an ambush and subsequently
escaping from prison. Judge Sprizzo found these crimes "political" and
thus not subject to extradition under the relevant treaty with Great
Britain . 5 The court did not even view the matter as doubtful, holding
that "the facts of this case present the assertion of the political
offense exception in its most classic form."'61
Doherty ruled that the use of violence is not "in itself dispositive"
of whether an act is political or criminal in nature.17 Neither is the use
of terrorism.'8 In resolving the question, the court said it must
consider as well "the context in which it is committed, the status of
the party committing the act, the nature of the organization on whose
behalf it is committed, and the particularized circumstances of the
place where the act takes place. '39 Applying his test, Judge Sprizzo
held that the PIRA was engaged in a "sporadic and informal mode of
warfare" against the British, and that the killing of the British officer
would not have been criminal if it had "occurred during the course of
more traditional military hostilities." 4 Further, the PIRA had the
requisite "organization, discipline, and command structure that distin-
guishes it from more amorphous groups such as the Black Liberation
Army or the Red Brigade" so that "the act of its members can
constitute political conduct."41
34. 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
35. Treaty of Extradition with the United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No.
8468 (effective Jan. 21, 1977). Article V(1) (c) (i) provides for denial of extradition if "the
offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party as one of
a political character."
36. Matter of Doherty by Gov. of United Kingdom, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
37. Id. at 275.
38. The Court is not persuaded by the fact that the current political
administration in the United States has strongly denounced terrorist acts
and has stated that to refuse extradition in this case might jeopardize
foreign relations. The Treaty vests the determination of the limits of the
political offense exception in the courts and therefore reflects a Congres-
sional judgment that the decision not be made on the basis of what may be
the current view of any one political administration.
Id. at 277, n.6.
39. Id. at 275.
40. Id. at 276.
41. Id.
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Judge Sprizzo, like Judge Lord in LaForge, cast blame upon the
victim of the crime. "The death of Captain Westmacott, while a most
tragic event, occurred in the context of an attempted ambush of a
British army patrol. It was the British Army's response to that action
that gave rise to Captain Westmacott's death.' 42 Indeed, any concern
for the victims of the respective crimes was conspicuously absent
from all the decisions discussed above. On the contrary, individuals
and businesses engaged in activities that were entirely lawful but
regarded as unacceptable by lawbreakers were in effect deemed
unworthy of protection by the law.
These decisions raise other legal and moral questions as well.
Doherty has demonstrated that even homicidal terrorists can success-
fully evade punishment by claiming a "political" objective for their
acts. Is any crime, any brutality, perpetrated for a professed "politi-
cal" end to be immune from legal penalties? Judge Sprizzo himself
recognized the problem.
Surely the atrocities at Dachau, Aushwitz, and other death
camps would be arguably political within the meaning of
that definition. The same would be true of My Lai, the
Bataan death march, Lidice, the Katyn Forest Massacre,
and a whole host of violations of international law that the
civilized world is, has been, and should be unwilling to
accept. Indeed, the Nuremberg trials would have no legiti-
macy or meaning if any act done for a political purpose
could be properly classified as a political offense.43
In attempted resolution of this issue, Doherty concluded that the
determinative factor would be whether "the nature of the act is such
as to be violative of international law and inconsistent with interna-
tional standards of civilized conduct."44 Yet, this merely begs the
question. There is no judicial authority to elevate international law in
general over federal and state constitutions and laws. Further, there is
little agreement as to what constitutes international law; and there-
fore, the vague standard thus offered is an invitation to wholesale
judicial discretion. For example, in Judge Lord's statement releasing
the Sperry computer defendants was the comment that there is a
"plausible argument that international law prohibits what our country
is doing by way of manufacturing mass weapons of destruction."4 5
42. Id.
43. Id. at 274.
44. Id.
45. Record, United States v. LaForge and Katt, No. CR-84-66 at 14 (D. Minn.
Nov. 8, 1984).
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Moreover, the dubious value of international law in controlling the use
of "political" justifications for crimes was illustrated in Doherty by its
failure to proscribe the crime of murder.
The rulings discussed above thus establish no effective restric-
tions on the types of crimes for which defendants could seek to avoid
conviction or punishment based on ostensible political or ideological
motives for their conduct. Furthering a political cause has been
allowed to justify trespass, property damage, and even murder; the
same defense presumably would be available for everything in be-
tween.
Another issue raised by these decisions is whether there is to be
any differentiation between the substance of political or moral beliefs
in determining whether defendants espousing them can seek to ex-
cuse criminal behavior. If "peace" protesters and PIRA terrorists are
to be exonerated because of their political opinions, why should others
not have the same opportunity? Will these rulings enable all who
claim to be acting because of ideological or moral motivations to evade
the consequences of their illegal conduct, or only those whose political
philosophy is shared by sympathetic judges and juries?
How should the decisions be applied, for example, to illegal
activity against abortion clinics by persons opposed on religious and
moral grounds to abortion? Equal protection would seem to require
that they be extended the same rights granted the other defendants.
State v. Brechon,4 6 however, implied that not all political and moral
beliefs could be introduced to exonerate lawbreakers' crimes. The
Minnesota Supreme Court declared "distinguishable" 47 Cleveland v.
Municipality of Anchorage8 which barred anti-abortion protesters
from excusing violations of criminal trespass laws by virtue of their
moral and religious beliefs. Incidentally, the Cleveland concurring
opinion of Dimond, J., cited 49 a Minneapolis Municipal Court decision5 0
excluding all evidence of a medical, religious, or philosophical nature
offered by abortion opponents to justify their trespass at an abortion
clinic.
This is not to argue that those disapproving of abortion, any
more than "peace" protesters or PIRA terrorists, should be immune
46. 352 N.W.2d 745 (Minn. 1984).
47. Id. at 751, n. 3.
48. 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981).
49. Id. at 1084.
50. State v. Rasmussen, No. 1010575 (Hennepin County Mun. Ct. Oct. 5, 1978),
47 U.S.L.W. 2331.
1985]
Rothenberg: Political Ideology and the Judicial Process:  The Resurrection of
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
106 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
from the consequences of their criminal acts. On the contrary, all
should be judged by the same law. The enforcement of the law should
not depend upon the existence or nature of a given defendant's (or
judge's or jury's) political ideology.
In addition to their other defects, the decisions in each of the
cases discussed above ignored the challenge to democratic and consti-
tutional processes represented by the conduct of the respective
defendants. The judges failed to acknowledge that, even if one con-
cedes the sincerity of the political motives of the defendants, there are
many legal methods in democratic societies to seek changes in public
policies. In the U.S. (and in Britain as well) those advocating disarma-
ment, changes in the status of Northern Ireland, or any other political
position have ample opportunity to speak out, engage in lawful
demonstrations, and influence the electoral process through financial
contributions and political organizing. There is no need or justification
to commit murder or violate the rights of others in lesser ways in
order to express one's viewpoint. To condone such conduct is to
sanction the use of illegal and undemocratic actions against policies
and laws adopted through the democratic process. Comparable efforts
to justify trespass at abortion clinics have been upbraided on the
grounds that they would "interfere with constitutional rights" by
permitting "defendants to choose what laws they will obey based on
their own moral code" and "to violate the laws in order to enforce
their own ideas." 51
United States v. Quilty2 emphasized the availability of "reasona-
ble, legal alternative[s] to violating the law" in rejecting an appeal by
defendants convicted of illegally entering military property to stage
an anti-nuclear demonstration. An earlier seventh circuit decision,
United States v. Cullen5 4 regarded the use of purported political and
moral objectives as exacerbating rather than justifying violations of
the criminal law.
One who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into his
own hands thereby demonstrates his conviction that his
own ability to determine policy is superior to democratic
decision making. Appellant's professed unselfish motiva-
51. Note, Necessity as a Defense to a Charge of Criminal Trespass in an
Abortion Clinic, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 501, 515, 516 (1979).
52. 741 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1984).
53. Id. at 1033. The decision held that the defense of "necessity" was cogniza-
ble only in the absence of reasonable alternatives to violating the law.
54. 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971).
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tion, rather than a justification, actually identifies a form of
arrogance which organized society cannot tolerate. A sim-
ple rule, reiterated by a peaceloving scholar, amply refutes
appellant's arrogant theory of defense: "No man or group is
above the law."' 55
Finally, as was illustrated in the Sacco-Vanzetti case, allowing
political ideology to infect the judical process can be a double-edged
sword. It can just as easily be used by politically prejudiced prosecu-
tors, judges, and juries to persecute innocent persons as to free
otherwise guilty defendants from conviction and punishment.
The successful interposition of political motives by those accused
of criminal conduct depends upon a sympathetic judge or jury or both.
The support enjoyed by the defendants in the Minnesota, Pennsylva-
nia, and New York cases discussed above should be offered by fewer
judges and juries in the future. By the end of President Reagan's
second term, it is probable that more than half the members of the
federal bench will be his appointees. It is rather unlikely that many of
these new judges would share Judge Lord's view that persons con-
victed of destroying computers built for U.S. defense purposes are
"friends of the people"6 or would, like Judge Sprizzo in Doherty,'.7
excuse terrorist acts directed against officials of democratic, allied
governments. The electorate, too, is becoming more conservative, and
this will be reflected in the attitudes of juries. It will be recalled that
the juries in LaForge8 and Berrigan9 rendered guilty verdicts.
If the decisions reviewed in this article are to be the opening
wedge to allowing political ideology free rein in our courts, there is
every possibility that its use in future cases could lead to convictions
in otherwise doubtful cases or to stiffening the punishment of political
activists convicted of crimes. Where the claims of "peace" protesters
to political and moral superiority went unchallenged in previous cases,
conservative prosecutors could subject to critical scrutiny the "peace"
movement's perceived increasing propensity to engage in organized
illegal conduct, its arguable double standard vis-a-vis policies of the
U.S. and the Soviet Union and its Third World and terrorist allies, and
55. Id. at 392.
56. Record, United States v. LaForge and Katt, No. CR-84-66 at 18 (D. Minn.
Nov. 8, 1984).
57. Matter of Doherty by Gov. of United Kingdom, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
58. United States v. LaForge and Katt, No. CR-84-66 (D. Minn. Oct. 11, 1984).
59. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 325 Pa. Super. 242, 472 A.2d 1099 (1984).
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the impact of its program on U.S. national security.60 The adherence
by defendants to controversial ideologies could be a powerful weapon
in the hands of prosecutors in obtaining convictions and severe
sentences. Future opponents of U.S. defense and foreign policy, in lieu
of being lauded by judges and jurors for their political and moral
motivations for breaking the law, could be placed in increased jeop-
ardy because of these same ideologies.
Some may find good sport in the prospect of hoisting the left
with its own petard. Whatever one's political predilections, however,
it would only compound the damage suffered by the judicial process
by the rulings giving precedence to political ideology over the law.
The cure for the decisions favoring "peace" protesters and terrorists
is not a succession of new Sacco-Vanzetti type cases but a restoration
of primacy of the rule of law. Politics should be banished from the
courtroom.
60. See, for an example of such criticism, R. & E. ISAAC, in THE COERCIVE
UTOPIANS 141-165 (1983).
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